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INTRODUCTION 
On a Sunday afternoon in the West Bank city of Hebron, a bullet 
from a high velocity rifle passed through the head of fourteen-year-old 
Nizin Jamjoum. 1 Nizin was the youngest of nine children and hoped to 
become an engineer when she grew up.2 Her dream was to someday 
take a holiday in Mexico.3 Her family did not know why she dreamed of 
vacationing there. Her oldest brother would later say, "she just loved the 
idea of taking a holiday in Mexico."4 On the day of her death, Nizin and 
her brother Marwan went out to their porch to observe a funeral 
procession-turned-riot taking place below.5 Moments after the bullet 
entered her skull, she died in the arms of her brother. That day, Marwan 
vowed that "if not today, then maybe tomorrow or after one month, I 
will avenge the killing of my sister."6 
While tragic, the events that led to Nizin's death were not unusual. 
Instead, her death is only a small link in a large chain of events that 
come together to form the current Intifada. Five weeks earlier in this 
same chain of events, a Palestinian suicide bomber destroyed Egged 
Bus 32A in Jerusalem, killing nineteen Israeli civilians.7 Hamas claimed 
responsibility.8 Israel's official retaliation included the missile attack on 
the Jerusalem home of one of Hamas' leaders, Salah Shehadeh.9 
* The author would like to warmly thank Professor Donna Arzt for her ongoing guidance 
and assistance. He would also like to thank Professor Gregory Fox for his comments on later 
drafts. 
1. Mitch Potter, Cycle of Violence, a Circle of Grief, TORONTO STAR, July 30, 2002, at 
AIO. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Mohammed Daraghmeh, Palestinians Defy Curfew in Nab/us Under Noses of Israeli 
Soldiers, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, July 29, 2002. 
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[hereinafter W.S.J.]. 
8. Id. 
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Shehadeh was the head of the military arm of Hamas in the Gaza Strip 
and had been the target of several prior assassination attempts which 
were aborted due to the presence of Palestinian civilians. 10 The Israeli 
government held Shehadeh responsible for the planning and execution 
of terrorist acts which killed dozens of Israeli civilians. 11 The attack 
resulted in the death of Shehadeh and fourteen other Palestinian 
civilians.12 
In the wake of Shehadeh' s death, gunmen in the West Bank from 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade retaliated by killing four Israeli settlers in a 
drive-by shooting. 13 Among the Israeli dead was twenty one-year-old 
Elazar Leibovitz, a resident of the A vraham A vinu settlement located 
near Hebron in the West Bank. 14 At the funeral procession held for 
Leibovitz the following Sunday in Hebron, mourners from neighboring 
settlements erupted into violence.15 Moshe Givati, an Israeli Minister's 
aide who was present at the funeral, observed that "for some reason they 
were all carrying army-issue weapons, and they charged into the 
Palestinian houses. That's when the fracas began .... There were long 
bursts of fire by the Israelis-into the air and at the houses."16 One of 
the bullets fired during the riot caused Nizin's death. 17 
The foregoing events are representative of the thousands of acts 
which have formed the violent chain that has marked the al-Aqsa 
Intifada. 18 Again and again, the Israeli government assassinates a 
Palestinian militant, followed by a retaliatory Palestinian suicide 
bombing, followed by another Israeli targeted killing.19 Recent events 
Revenge for Hamas Leader's Death; 15 Die in Israeli 'Targeted Killing', BALI. SUN, July 
24, 2002, at Al. 
10. Id.; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Findings Of The Inquiry Into The Death Of 
Sa/ah Shehadeh, Aug. 2, 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar. 1, 
2005) [hereinafter Inquiry]. 
11. Inquiry, supra note I 0. 
12. Hermann, supra note 9. 
13. Uli Schmetzer, 4 Settles Slain in the West Bank, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 2002, at 3. 
14. Nadav Shragai et al., Three Family Members Killed in Attack Near Hebron Friday 
Night, HA' ARETZ, July 28, 2002; Periodic Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of 
the Occupied Territories, U.N.G.A.O.R., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/421 (2002) 
[hereinafter Periodic Report]. 
15. Amos Harel and Jonathan Lis, Minister's Aide Calls Hebron Riots A 'Pogrom,' 
HA' ARETZ, July 30, 2002; Periodic Report, supra note 14. 
16. Id. 
17. Id.; Potter, supra note 1. 
18. See infra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text. 
19. See MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL, Resources, Conflict Statistics (Jan. 5, 2005), 
available at http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/resources/mrates.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 
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show that the chain of violence continues to grow. In March 2004, 
Israel launched a missile attack against Hamas' wheelchair-bound 
spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Y assin as he left a mosque in Gaza 
City. 20 The attack killed eight, including Y assin, his bodyguards and 
bystanders.21 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon authorized the attack, 
calling Y assin an "archmurderer" committed to "the murder and the 
killing of Jews wherever they may be and the destruction of the state of 
Israel."22 The following month Yassin's successor Dr. Abdel Aziz 
Rantisi was killed by another Israeli missile strike.23 Hamas retaliated in 
August with the suicide bombings of two busses killing sixteen Israelis 
and wounding over a hundred. 24 Thus the chain continues while 
combatants on both sides attempt to morally and legally justify their 
actions.25 
This note examines the legal justifications for these acts under 
international humanitarian law, in order to determine whether the law is 
sufficient to break the chain of suicide bombings and retaliatory 
assassinations in Israel and Palestine. The legal status of the suicide 
bombing of Egged Bus 32A and the retaliatory assassination of 
Shehadeh are examined as typical instances of violence that have 
marked the al-Aqsa Intifada. The attacks are analyzed to determine how 
the law should be applied to prevent this violence. Part I provides 
background information on the suicide bombing and retaliatory 
2005). This note will use the terms "assassination" and "extrajudicial killing" without any 
attempt to attach political connotations. The government of Israel holds that "Israel neither 
condones nor takes part in 'assassinations' or 'extra-judicial killings' .... [T]hese terms are 
derived from spheres unrelated to armed conflict and are blatantly misleading descriptions 
of Israel's justified counter-terrorist operations." The Israeli government prefers terms such 
as 'targeted killings' or 'preventive, precisely targeted operations."' Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: Palestinian Violence and Terrorism; The 
International War Against Terrorism, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa [hereinafter Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, F.A.Q.] (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"assassination" as "[t]he act of deliberately killing someone" and "extrajudicial" as 
"[o]utside court; outside the functioning of the court system." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
109, 606 (7th ed. 1999). This note follows Black's Law Dictionary's definitions of these 
terms. 
20. James Bennet, Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2004, at Al. 
21. James Bennet, The Mideast Turmoil: Protest; Palestinians Swear Vengeance For 
Killing Cleric by Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at Al. 
22. Id. 
23. Greg Myre, In Loss of Leaders, Hamas Discovers a Renewed Strength, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2004, at 6. 
24. Steven Erlanger, Twin Blasts Kill 16 in Israel; Hamas Claims Responsibility, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at A12. 
25. See infra Parts III, IV. 
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assassination. Part II discusses international humanitarian law relating 
to war crimes and crimes against humanity, while Part III analyzes the 
legality of suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings under 
international humanitarian law. Part IV discusses whether these acts are 
properly characterized as war crimes, while emphasizing the role of 
accountability in potentially breaking the chain of violence. The note 
concludes in Part V with an observation on the importance of respecting 
international humanitarian law in conflicts against terrorism. 
I. THE ATTACKS OF JUNE 18 AND JULY 23, 2002 
The al-Aqsa Intifada, which began on September 28, 2000, is the 
second Intifada or "uprising" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first 
Intifada began in 1987 and ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords 
in 1993.26 The Intifada arose due to long-term discontent in Palestine 
over the Israeli occupation. The second, or al-Aqsa Intifada, began due 
to a number of factors. In the run-up to the violence, Palestinian 
frustration was rising due to the lack of progress at the Camp David 
Accords in the summer of 2000.27 The issues of the right of return for 
Palestinian refugees, the status of East Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the drafting of final borders 
reportedly stalled the negotiations.28 Further, there had been no 
improvement in the economic well-being of Palestinians since the Oslo 
Accords, the construction of settlements and settler bypass roads 
continued, and much of the land that Palestinians believed destined for a 
Palestinian State remained under Israeli occupation.29 On the other 
hand, politicians on the Israeli right noted that the Palestinian leadership 
was "not educating its people for peace, not collecting illegal weapons 
and not acting to reduce incitement against Israel. "30 In this atmosphere, 
Ariel Sharon's visit "demonstrate[ing] Jewish sovereignty" over the al-
Aqsa on the top of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on the September 28 
26. THE ECONOMIST, Chronology of the Middle East Conflict, available at 
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory .cfm?Story _id= 19224 72 (last visited Mar. 
1, 2005). 
27. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Country Reports, Israel/The Occupied 
Territories, Nov. 2000, at 43 [hereinafter E.I.U.]. 
28. Id. at 43-44; Deborah Sontag, And Yet So Far: A Special Report; Quest for Mideast 
Peace: How and Why it Failed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at Al; BBC NEWS, A History 
of Conflict, Second Intifada, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middleeast/03/v3iptimeline/ html/2000.stm (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
29. E.I.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28. 
30. Sontag, supra note 28. 
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sparked violent protests, setting in motion the "al-Aqsa Intifada."31 
Targeting a bus for a suicide bombing is typical of militant 
Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians. 32 The organizations which 
perpetrate suicide bombings choose locations where they can inflict the 
greatest number of Israeli civilian deaths. 33 A senior Hamas leader 
noted that "[t]he main thing is to guarantee that a large number of the 
enemy will be affected. "34 In doing so, Hamas tries to achieve the 
following goals: promote and publicize their cause, gather new recruits 
and terrorize Israel's population. 35 Consequently, buses are a routine 
target because they present an opportunity to kill a large number of 
Israelis in a single attack. 
The June 18, 2002 bombing followed the pattern of targeting 
buses. At 7:50 in the morning, Mohammed al-Ral boarded Egged Bus 
number 32A in a residential neighborhood of Jerusalem.36 He was a 
student of Islamic law from the Al Faraa refugee camp in the West 
Bank.37 Al-Ral carried a bag filled with nail-studded explosives and ball 
bearings which he used to kill his victims. 38 The nineteen victims were 
all civilians, mostly school children and people on their way to work. 39 
Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.40 Hamas leader Dr. Abdel 
Aziz Rantisi promised to halt the attacks if Israel withdrew from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.41 Condemning the attack, the Palestinian 
Authority issued a statement promising to make every effort to "find 
and stop anyone carrying out [suicide bombing] operations. ''42 After 
viewing the remains of the bus and the victims' bodies lined up on the 
sidewalk at the scene of the attack, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
vowed to fight Palestinian terror.43 Residents of the neighborhood and 
31. E.l.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28. 
32. E.1.U., supra note 27, at 43; Sontag, supra note 28. 
33. Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against 
Israeli Civilians, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ [hereinafter Erased in a 
Moment] (last visited Mar. 5, 2005. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide Bombing at Patt Junction in Jerusalem 
June 18, 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa (last visited Mar 5, 2005). 
37. Id. 
38. Id.; The bomber's name was reported as Mohammed al-Ghoul. W.S.J., supra note 
7. 
39. W.S.J., supra note 7. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. BBC News, Jerusalem Bus Bomb Kills 20 June 18, 2002, available at 
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right-wing activists protested at the scene of the attack and demanded 
that the Israeli government expel Palestinian Authority Chairman 
Y asser Arafat. 44 Meanwhile, Israeli security officials met after the 
attack, and promised to respond with a "harsh and ongoing widespread 
operation focusing on destroying the terrorist infrastructure."45 
Hamas leaders are often targets of Israeli extrajudicial killings.46 
Israel has often used targeted assassinations of militants to respond to 
Palestinian terrorism. Salah Shehadeh, the head of Hamas' military 
wing in the Gaza Strip, was a typical target for Israeli assassination. 
Israel openly pursues the policy as part of its fight against terrorism.47 
Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense broadly defined the policy by 
explaining: "I can tell you unequivocally what the policy is. If anyone 
has committed or is planning to carry out terrorist attacks, he has to be 
hit. . . . It is effective, precise, and just. "48 The killings are general?; 
carried out by an aerial missile attack or through the use of snipers. 9 
While Israel's military normally attempts to avoid civilian casualties 
during targeted killings, innocent people make up at least 30-35% of the 
persons killed in these attacks. 50 
The extrajudicial killing of Shehadeh on July 23, 2002 followed 
the policy of targeted killings.51 An Israeli F-16 fighter-jet launched a 
missile into Shehadeh' s three-story apartment building, bringing down 
the building and several adjacent structures.52 Fourteen additional 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/middle_east/2050955.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
44. Etgar Lefkovits, 19 Killed In Jerusalem Bus Bombing, JERUSALEM POST, June 19, 
2002. 
45. Herb Keinon and Margot Dudkevitch, Cabinet: IDF To Respond On Wider Scale, 
JERUSALEM POST, June 19, 2002. 
46. Amnesty International, Broken Lives-A Year of Intifada, Nov. 13, 2001, at 37, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engMDE150832001 (last visited Jan. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter Broken Lives]. The term extrajudicial killing will be defined in Section 
IV. 
47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, F.A.Q., supra note 19. 
48. Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission Established Pursuant to 
Commission Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, 57th 
Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/20011121 (2001) [hereinafter Report]. 
49. Id. at 56-58, Broken Lives, supra note 46, at 35-37. 
50. Margot Dudkevitch, Halutz Says Targeted Killings Have 85% Success Rate, 
JERUSALEM POST, June 25, 2003, at 2. While Israel typically avoids civilian deaths, the IDF 
noted that the attacks on Shehadeh proceeded despite intelligence showing that his wife was 
present. Id.; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Statistics: Three Years of al-Aqsa 
Intifada, available at http://pchrgaza.org/special/statisics.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) 
[hereinafter Statistics]. 
51. The attack was unique only because of the unusually large number of civilians 
killed. 
52. Hermann, supra note 9. 
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civilians were killed including a number of children.53 A joint Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) and Israeli Security Agency inquiry found that 
"the procedures followed in the IDF operation were correct and 
professional, as were the operational assessments."54 However, they 
also noted that "if their information had indicated with certainty the 
presence of innocent civilians in Shehadeh' s vicinity, the timing . . . 
would have been changed."55 Like the suicide bombing of Bus 32A a 
month before, the attack resulted in promises of revenge. Mohammed 
al-Hweiti, who lived in a building neighboring Shehadeh and whose 
wife and children were killed in the attack proclaimed: "Who is the 
terrorist now?. . . Now the Israelis will get a reaction. "56 A Palestinian 
militant shouting into a microphone declared: "We are going to go deep 
into Israel. We will turn their blood into rivers. We will follow the 
Israelis into their homes. Revenge will come very soon. "57 Hamas 
promised a continuation of the chain of violence. On al-Jazeera, senior 
Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantissi promised that Hamas would "chase 
[Israelis] in their houses and in their apartments, the same way they 
have destroyed our houses and our apartments. "58 
The killing of Shehadeh came as a reaction to Hamas' use of 
suicide bombers against the Israeli public under his leadership. 
However, the attack on Shehadeh, intended to deter future suicide 
bombers, has instead resulted in promises of more suicide attacks 
against Israelis. These two attacks are but links in a chain of killings 
that have left over 3,500 Palestinians and nearly 1,000 Israelis dead 
since the start of the lntifada.59 To stop this cycle, the violent chain of 
attacks and reprisals must be broken. The following sections will 
analyze the role of international law in breaking this vicious cycle. 
II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
International humanitarian law applies in all situations of 
53. Hermann, supra note 9. 
54. Inquiry, supra note 10. 
55. Id.; Keinon and Dudkevitch, supra note 45 (quoting Israeli Air Force Maj.-Gen. 
Dan Halutz stating that in the case of the attack on Shehadeh "[ e ]ven though his wife was 
with him, we opted to carry out the attack"). 
56. Herman, supra note 9. 
57. Id. 
58. Suzanne Goldenburg, 12 Dead in Attack on Hamas, GUARDIAN, July 23, 2003, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,761746,99.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2005). 
59. Middle East Policy Council, supra note 19. 
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international and certain domestic armed conflicts.60 International 
humanitarian law constrains the conduct of nations, regardless of 
whether a state of war exists.61 Therefore, to show that international 
humanitarian law applies to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, 
the status of the conflict and the parties to the conflict must first be 
determined to allow an examination of individual war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
Originally, the law of international armed conflict applied only to 
armed conflicts between States. 62 International humanitarian law 
relating to the conduct of war developed from the 1907 Hague 
Convention and the four 1948 Geneva Conventions and their two 
Additional Protocols. 63 While the Hague Convention of 1907 states that 
its provisions apply only during times of war, in practice the 
Convention is applied in all international armed conflict. 64 Likewise, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians Persons in 
Time of War (hereinafter "Geneva IV") applies "to all cases of declared 
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. "65 Over time, the law has broadened to 
include guerrillas fighting in wars of national liberation and under 
military occupation.66 Additionally, as is the case in the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Geneva IV governs "all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance. "67 The Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 on the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter "First Additional 
Protocol") more broadly to encompass the "situations referred to in 
[Geneva IV, including] armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation ... "68 Accordingly, 
60. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in HANDBOOK 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAWIN ARMED CONFLICTS 39, 42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
61. Id. 
62. Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
63. Id. at 330. 
64. Hague Convention (IV) concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague Convention], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
lawofwar/hague04.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); Greenwood supra note 60 at 39. 
65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm (last 
visited Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Geneva IV]; Greenwood, supra note 60, at 52. 
66. Greenwood, supra note 60 at 332. 
67. Geneva IV, supra note 65. 
68. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the 
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Geneva IV and the First Additional Protocol apply in cases of military 
occupation of territory. 69 
Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories since the end of the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war,70 in which Israel replaced Jordan and Egypt as 
the power controlling the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.71 Although 
Egypt, Israel and Jordan are all parties to the four Geneva Conventions, 
the Conventions apply regardless of the States' status as parties because 
the Conventions have crystallized into customary international law. 72 
The Conventions' status as customary international law is evidenced by 
the fact that every one of the 191 member States of the United Nations 
has ratified the Geneva Conventions. 73 There is also a very strong 
argument that both Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have 
crystallized into customary international law. 74 These reasons include 
the fact that governments, United Nations bodies and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regularly invoke the Protocol 
during armed conflict.75 Additionally, 163 States, including four of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council, have ratified the 
Protocol.76 
The actions of the international community also demonstrate that 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 
1, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm (last visited on Mar. 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter Protocol I). The Commentaries define the "expression 'alien occupation' in the 
sense ... as a State." Id. 
69. It should be noted that under Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol, neither the 
Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols apply to "situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar nature ... " Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
June 8, 1977, art. 1, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/94.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2005). 
70. United Nations Department of Public Information, The Question of Palestine & The 
United Nations, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
71. Id. 
72. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in HANDBOOK 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 23-24 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
73. International Committee of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols (June 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/W eb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/party _gc (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
74. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: 
A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 93-95 (2001). 
75. Id. at 93. 
76. International Committee of the Red Cross, Material on International Humanitarian 
Law, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). The only 
permanent member of the Security Council that has not ratified the Protocols is the United 
States, although it is a signatory. Id. Nevertheless, the United States requires its military to 
comply with much of the Protocols; Scharf, supra note 74, at 94. 
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the Geneva IV applies to the conflict in the occupied Palestinian 
territories. There is a great number of United Nations Security Council 
and General Assembly Resolutions calling upon Israel to observe the 
Convention, while carrying out its occupation.77 Additionally, the 
ICRC, the organization imbued with the status of third-party monitor 
under Articles 30 and 143 of Geneva IV, has declared that the entire 
document is applicable to the occupied territories.78 The ICRC 
declaration of the Convention's applicability is particularly noteworthy 
because of the organization's longstanding reluctance to make political 
statements. 79 
Israel has denied that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to its 
occupation of the Palestinian territories. 80 Rather, the Israeli government 
claims to abide voluntarily by the humanitarian aspects of the 
Convention.81 Israel has advanced the "missing reversioner" theory, 
arguing that the Geneva IV does not apply where the occupying power 
has not displaced a legitimate sovereign. 82 The term 'reversioner' 
signifies a party state to which the territory reverts to after the cessation 
of hostilities. The theory contends that neither Egypt in the Gaza Strip, 
nor Jordan in the West Bank, were legitimate sovereigns or 
"reversioners" because of their alleged unlawful aggression during the 
1948-49 Arab-Israeli war.83 For that reason, Israel does not "occupy" 
the West Bank and Gaza, but instead "administers" the territory in the 
absence of a legitimate sovereign. 84 Thus, Israel should not be held 
accountable under the Geneva Convention nor under the law of 
occupation generally.85 This argument is sometimes supplemented with 
an additional theory that Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip is the result of a "defensive conquest" which grants legal title to an 
occupying power acting defensively where there is an absence of a 
77. See Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 97-98 (2003) ). 
78. Id. at 99. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 92-93. 
82. Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and 
Samaria, 3 ISR. L. Rev. 279 (1968); Richard A. Falk & Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of 
International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza, in 
INTERNATIONAL LA w AND THE. ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 131 (Emma 
Playfair ed., 1992). 
83. Falk & Weston, supra note 82, at 131. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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legitimate sovereign. 86 
The missing reversioner theory has enjoyed little support from 
scholars or from the international community. 87 First, if the theory were 
accepted, it would allow any belligerent occupier to avoid the 
requirements of occupation under the Geneva IV by questioning the 
validity of the land claim of the state that previously possessed the 
territory. 88 The theory also requires one to accept that because the 
Palestinians were subjected to Jordanian and Egyptian aggression in 
1948, they may therefore be further victimized by Israel. 89 Such a result 
contradicts the object and purposes of the Geneva Convention of 
protecting civilian populations in time of war.90 Second, the concept of 
a "defensive conquest" must be rejected, as it violates the peremptory 
norm of international law that a territory cannot be obtained through the 
use of force.91 
International humanitarian law applies to both Israeli and 
Palestinian aggression during the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada. As a 
State actor, Israel is obliged to follow customary international law, 
including humanitarian law. Likewise, national liberation movements 
are subject to international rights and obligations where the movement 
has international legitimization based on the principle of self-
determination, and where the movement strives to gain control over 
territory. 92 Where a Palestinian liberation movement meets these two 
conditions, they enjoy limited legal personality and are subject to the 
attendant obligations of international humanitarian law.93 
By examining the international humanitarian law applicable to the 
attacks of June 18 and July 23, 2002, one can then determine whether 
the attacks were either war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
A. War Crimes 
War crimes are serious violations of the international humanitarian 
law, which regulates armed conflict and includes both Hague and 
Geneva law.94 In Prosecutor v. Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), the 
86. Falk & Weston, supra note 82, at 131. 
87. Imseis, supra note 77, at 95. 
88. Id. at 95-96. 
89. Id. at 96. 
90. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 2 & art. 3, para. 1; Imseis, supra note 77, at 95-96. 
91. U.N. CHARTER art 2, para. 4; Cassese, supra note 62, at 256-57. 
92. Cassese, supra note 62, at 76. 
93. Id. at 76-77; see infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion on the Palestinian Authority's 
and Hamas' status as a national liberation movement under international humanitarian law. 
94. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2003). 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
stated that war crimes must consist of '"a serious infringement of an 
international rule,' i.e., 'a breach of a rule protecting important values, 
and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim. "'95 
Additionally, "the rule violated must either belong to the corpus of 
customary law or be part of an applicable treaty."96 Finally, "the 
violation must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. "97 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court identifies 
violations of international humanitarian law which qualify as war 
crimes, and it also identifies the elements of these acts. 98 While the 
Rome Statute is not considered to be customary law, these elements of 
crimes are drawn from sources which are customary international law, 
namely the Hague Convention, the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols. 99 This subsection focuses upon those war crimes 
identified under Article 8 of the Rome Statute which are applicable to 
suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings: Article 8(2)(a)(i), the war 
crime of willful killing; Article 8(2)(b )(i), the war crime of attacking 
civilians; and Article 8(2)(b )(iv), the war crime of excessive incidental 
death, injury or damage. 100 
The elements of the war crimes discussed below are customary 
international law, which has been applied in international criminal 
tribunals. The ICTY stated the three general elements of a war crime 
under customary international law. 101 First, the act must be committed 
during armed conflict. 102 Second, the act must be a serious violation of 
95. CASSESE, supra note 94; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 
at para. 94 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeaVdecision-
e/51002.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
96. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 94. 
97. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
98. Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 
Jul. 1, 2002), 37 I.L.M. 399, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm 
(last visited Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
99. Hague Convention, supra note 64; Geneva IV, supra note 65; See Scharf, supra 
note 74, at 91-98 for a discussion of the customary nature of the ICC's provisions on war 
crimes. 
100. Rome Statute, supra note 98. 
101. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45 (June 14, 1999), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar 
5, 2005); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at para 258 (Dec. 10, 1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar 
5, 2005). 
102. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at para. 258. 
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customary international law.103 Finally the act must be sufficiently 
connected to the international armed conflict. 104 
This note uses the definitions of the elements of war crimes as laid 
out by the International Criminal Court in the Elements of Crimes text 
and adopts the ICTY's general elements of an act considered a war 
crime under international law. Under the Elements of Crimes text, the 
last two elements of each war crime remain the same: "[t]he conduct 
took place in the context of and was associated with an international 
armed conflict" and "[t]he perpetrator was aware of factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict."105 
The first of these satisfies two of the ICTY general elements of a war 
crime, i.e., that the act be committed in armed conflict, and that the act 
be connected to the armed conflict. 106 The second establishes part of the 
requisite mens rea of the actor, which requires that the actor possess 
knowledge of the existence of a State of armed conflict. 107 The 
remainder of this subsection will examine the first three elements of the 
war crimes for the Elements of Crimes text. These are the elements 
which show that the criminalized act is a serious violation of customary 
international law. 
1. Willful Killing 
The Rome Statute details three elements for the war crime of 
willful killing, which demonstrates that the act being criminalized is a 
serious violation of customary international law: 
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or 
more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual 
103. Hague Convention, supra note 64; Geneva IV, supra note 65; Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 9th Sess., 3 l 75th 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-
april04-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Furundzija, Case No. 
IT-95-1711, at para. 168. 
104. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45. 
105. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crime, ICC-ASP/1/3, art. 8(2)(b)(i), 
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsofcrimes.html (last visited 
Mar 5, 2005) [hereinafter Elements of Crime]. 
106. Id.; Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, at para. 45; Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-
17/1, at para. 258. 
107. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 9. 
13
Casey: Breaking the Chain of Violence in Israel and Palestine: Suicide B
Published by SURFACE, 2005
324 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 32:311 
circumstances that established that protected status.108 
The term "willful killing" comes directly from Geneva IV.109 The 
killing of protected persons is a grave breach of the Geneva Convention 
under Article 14 7. Protected persons are defined as "those who at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case 
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals."110 Additionally, the 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is an absolute prohibition 
on "[ v ]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds ... [of 
persons] taking no active part in the hostilities."111 
2. Attacking Civilians 
The war crime of attacking civilians is a serious violation of 
international law, which the Rome Statute describes as: 
1. the perpetrator directed an attack; 
2. the object of the attack was a civilian population as 
such or individual civilians not taking direct part m 
hostilities; 
3. the perpetrator intended the civilian population as 
such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities 
to be the object of the attack. 112 
Directing an attack against civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities is restricted under Articles 48 and 51 of the First Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which grants civilians a "general 
protection against dangers arising from military operations."113 The 
general prohibition merely codifies "pre-existing customary law, 
because the principle of distinction belongs to the oldest fundamental 
maxims of established customary rules of humanitarian law."114 Civilian 
status is not inalienable. Article 51 of the Additional Protocol states, 
"Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and 
108. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(a)(i). 
109. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 147. 
110. Id. at art. 4. 
111. Id. at art. 3. 
112. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(b)(i). 
113. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(1). 
114. Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 120 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
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for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."115 However, taking 
part in hostilities only causes a temporary loss of protection under 
humanitarian law, and therefore civilians "cannot be killed at any time 
other than while they are posing an imminent threat to lives."116 
3. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage 
The final war crime discussed is excessive incidental death, injury 
or damage. It is a serious violation of customary international law and 
is explained in the Rome Statute as: 
1. the perpetrator launched an attack; 
2. the attack was such that it would cause incidental 
death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment and that such death, injury or damage would be 
of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; 
3. the perpetrator knew that the attack would cause 
incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment and that such death, injury or damage 
would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated. 117 
Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions protects civilians from indiscriminate attacks, which 
includes attacks "not directed at a specific military objective" attacks 
"which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective" and attacks "which employ a method or 
means of combat [that] are of a nature to strike military objects and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction."118 The third element 
listed is taken from Article 51 ( 5)(b) of the First Additional Protocol 
which lists the types of attacks considered indiscriminate.119 Among 
115. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(3). 
116. Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its 
Policy of Assassinations, AI Index: MDE 15/056/2003, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
117. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
118. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(4). 
119. Id. at art. 51(5)(b). 
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these are attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."120 
Therefore, under international humanitarian law, there is a 
fundamental principle of proportionality which limits what may be 
considered a military target, and limits attacks on some targets that 
could otherwise be justified by a claim of "military necessity" if there is 
an expectation that civilians will be harmed. 121 
B. Crimes Against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity derive from international human rights 
law. 122 Crimes against humanity are prohibitions of conduct which harm 
the entire international communi1?; and which, by their prohibition, 
protect fundamental human rights. 23 These crimes carry a stigma that 
distinguishes them from war crimes. In holding that a German S.S. 
officer was guilty of war crimes, but that his actions were not crimes 
against humanity, the Dutch Court of Cassation in Albrecht stated that 
[C]rimes of this category are characterized either by their 
seriousness and their savagery ( barbaarsheid), or by their 
magnitude, or by the circumstance that they were part of a 
system designed to spread terror ( een system van 
terreurhandelingen ), or that they were a link in a deliberately 
pursued policy against certain groups of the population. 124 
Therefore, acts which qualify as crimes against humanity under 
customary international law must be grave, and are considered }us 
cogens.125 
Professor Cassese observes that all crimes against humanity share 
the following traits: the act must consist of particularly serious attack on 
human dignity; the attacks must be widespread-as opposed to isolated 
120. Protocol I, supra note 68, art. 51(5)(b). 
121. Oeter, supra note 114. 
122. CASSESE, supra note 95, at 64-65. 
123. Id. 
124. Jn re Ahlbrecht, Annual Digest of Public International Law, vol. 16 Int'l L. Rep. 
396, quoted in CASSESE, supra note 94, at 65. 
125. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 512-13 (1990) 
(discussing the nature ofjus cogens and crimes against humanity). 
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or sporadic events; and the victims of the crimes must be civilians.126 
Additionally, these acts are prohibited under humanitarian law 
regardless of whether they occur during armed conflict. 127 
The list of crimes against humanity contained within Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute reflects customary international law. The crimes listed 
are: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
( c) Enslavement; 
( d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
( e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or 
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3 or other grounds 
that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in 
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health. 128 
These offenses reflect the evolution of customary humanitarian 
126. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; cf Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, at para. 660 (May 7, 
1997); Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005); 
ICTY, supra note 103, art. 5(g); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) , available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) (providing 
examples of the characteristics of crimes against humanity). 
127. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; Scharf, supra note 74, at 88. 
128. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 7. 
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law, which originated with the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg following the Second World War. 129 The acts criminalized 
under Article 7 are derived from the acts criminalized under the statutes 
of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 130 
The crime against humanity relevant to the attacks of June 18 and 
July 23, 2002 is murder. The crime against humanity of murder has 
three elements under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.131 These 
elements are: 
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or 
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. 132 
These elements reflect the traits of crimes against humanity under 
customary international law discussed by Cassese.133 Like Cassese's 
first requirement that the attack be a particularly odious offense, an 
attack causing murder is perhaps the most serious attack on human 
dignity. 134 The second element requires that the attacks be widespread 
or systematic, as opposed to isolated or sporadic events and also 
requires that the victims of the crime are civilians.135 
The third element clarifies the requisite mens rea of a crime against 
humanity. Crimes against humanity are distinguished from war crimes 
by the requirement that the actor have "knowledge that the offences are 
part of a systematic policy or of widespread and large-scale abuses."136 
Crimes are considered systematic or widespread where they involve 
"the manifestation of a policy or a plan drawn up, or inspired by, States 
authorities or by the leading officials of a de facto state-like 
organization, or of an organized political group."137 M. Cherif Bassiouni 
elaborates on this point, arguing that the "widespread or systematic" 
129. See CASSESE, supra note 94 at 74-81, 91-94. 
130. Scharf, supra note 74, at 89. 
131. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 7(1)(a). 
132. Id. 
133. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id at 82. 
137. Id at 64. 
18
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/6
2005] Breaking the Chain of Violence in The Middle East 329 
requirement is the international or jurisdictional element raising the 
crime from a national to an international violation. 138 Bassiouni further 
notes that, as used under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the terms 
"widespread or systematic" serve two purposes.139 "The first is to 
eliminate spontaneous or uncontrolled group conflict from the scope of 
the crime. The second is to reflect the existence of "[S]tate action or 
policy" by State actors and the element of "policy" for non-State 
actors. 140 Therefore, under the third element, the actor must be acting 
under the color of a de facto State organization and intend for his or her 
actions to cause multiple murders of civilians.141 Consistent with 
international practice, there is no requirement that the conduct take 
place during armed conflict. 142 
Ill. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO THE 
ATTACKS OF JUNE 18 AND JULY 23, 2002 
Thirty five lives were lost during the attacks on June 18 and July 
23, 2002, yet there has been no prosecution of the perpetrators of these 
acts. 143 Meanwhile, the chain of violence has continued. Determining 
whether these attacks are violations of international humanitarian law 
may provide the international community another tool to help break the 
chain of conflict, by establishing the grounds ·for trying those who 
perpetrate these attacks. 
A. The Attack of June 18 
The suicide bombing of a bus in residential Jerusalem perpetrated 
by Hamas on June 18, 2002 claimed twenty lives. 144 This subsection 
asks whether the act was a war crime or crime against humanity under 
customary humanitarian law as delineated in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
138. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 243-
46 (2d rev. ed., 1999). 
139. Id. at 244-45. 
140. Id. at 245. 
141. Id. at 244-45; CASSESE, supra note 94, at 92; Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, 
art. 7(1)(a). 
142. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 64; Scharf, supra note 74, at 88. 
143. Palestinian Authority security personnel are regularly lax in their investigation and 
prosecution of those involved in terrorist attacks against Israelis. Israel has not, as of 
writing, prosecuted anyone for the civilian deaths in the attack the Shehadeh. See generally, 
Erased in a Moment, supra note 33. 
144. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Suicide Bombing at Patt Junction in 
Jerusalem, supra note 36. 
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1. Was the Attack of June 18, 2002 a War Crime? 
Under the Rome Statute, each war crime shares two elements, i.e., 
that the conduct took place during international armed conflict and that 
the perpetrator was aware of the existence of an armed conflict, such 
that his or her actions "took place in the context of and was associated 
with" the conflict. 145 The drafters noted that the term "international 
armed conflict" includes occupation. 146 
Israel has argued that the al-Aqsa Intifada constitutes international 
armed conflict due to the number and orchestration of the attacks. 147 
The Palestinians have argued that the conflict should be classified as an 
uprising against an occupying power.148 Either sides' characterization of 
the conflict is irrelevant because the conflict takes place in territory 
occupied by an "alien" power under Geneva IV and the First Additional 
Protocol. 149 Therefore, civilians caught in the conflict are protected and 
combatants are bound under international humanitarian law.150 
While not a sovereign State, the Palestinian Authority does have 
security and legal obligations under the Oslo Accords. 151 Under the 
Accords, the Palestinian Authority is obliged to maintain security and 
public order in the West Bank and Gaza, and to "apprehend, investigate 
and prosecute perpetrators· and all other persons directly or indirectly 
involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement."152 Palestinian 
Authority security forces are required to ensure respect for humanitarian 
law in territory under their control, and are specifically required to act to 
prevent violence and terror. 153 Further, under the law of State 
responsibility, States are responsible for conduct the State could control 
or for conduct the State allowed to occur. 154 Failure to prevent a terrorist 
145. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8. 
146. Id. 
147. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of 
Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 
No. 3 at 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/1 (1998), available at 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/UN/1998/ResOOl.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
148. Id. 
149. See supra Part II; see also Protocol I, supra note 68 (discussing the use of the term 
"alien occupation"). 
150. See supra Part II; see also Protocol I, supra note 68 (discussing the use of the term 
"alien occupation"). 
151. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 
28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., Art. XII-XV, at http://www.mfa.gov.il (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter Interim Agreement]; Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 44. 
152. Interim Agreement, supra note 151, Annex I, Art. Il(3)(c). 
153. Id. at art. II. 
154. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
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act, which the Palestinian Authority had the ability to stop, would make 
the Authority's leadership responsible for the act. 155 
Although the Palestinian Authority is not a State, the principles of 
State responsibility contained within the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter 
"Draft Articles") should apply by analogy because the Palestinian 
Authority has quasi-governmental powers and was established in order 
to become the future government of a Palestinian State. The quasi-
governmental status of the Palestinian Authority is not discussed in the 
Draft Articles. 156 The Palestinian authority is an official authority 
recognized by Israel and the international community, thus Article 9' s 
provisions on "[ c ]onduct carried out in the absence or default of the 
official authorities" do not apply. 157 The Commentaries state, "Article 9 
deals with the exceptional case of conduct in the exercise of elements of 
the governmental authority by a person or group of persons acting in the 
absence of the official authorities and without any actual authority to do 
so."158 Other Articles attributing the conduct of an organ of a State to 
the State do not apply as the Palestinian Authority is not an organ of the 
State of Israel. 159 However, under Article 10(2) of the Draft Articles, 
their obligations will apply retrospectively if and when the Palestinian 
Authority becomes the legitimate government of the Occupied 
Territories. 160 The Commentaries further state, "Article 10 deals with 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 
(2001) chp. IV .E.1, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State _responsibility/responsibility_ articles( e ).pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. 
155. Id. 
156. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-
First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 799 (2002) (noting that the Draft Articles "do not deal 
sufficiently with the right of individuals and non-state entities to invoke the responsibility of 
states"). 
157. Draft Articles, supra note 154, at art. 9. 
158. Int'l Law Comm'n, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp. No. 10, at 109, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), chp.IV.E.2, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State _responsibility /responsibility_ commentaries( e ). pdf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Commentaries to Draft Articles]. 
159. Draft Articles, supra note 154, art. 4-6 (defining a "State organ" as "all the 
individual or collective entities which make up the organization of the State and act on its 
behalf."); see also Commentaries to Draft Articles, supra note 158, at 44. Without doubt, 
the Palestinian Authority does not act on behalf of Israel. 
160. Draft Articles, supra note 154, art. 10(2) (requiring that "[t]he conduct of a 
movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the 
territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered 
an act of the new State under international law"). 
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the special case of attribution to a State of conduct of an insurrectional 
or other movement which ... succeeds in establishing a new State."161 
Therefore, the obligations of a State under international law apply to the 
Palestinian Authority either by analogy, or assuming ultimate 
Palestinian statehood, eventual actuality. 
These obligations extend to other organized factions, including 
militants such as Hamas who are party to the conflict. 162 Hamas should 
be considered bound by international humanitarian law because the 
organization falls under the definition of a national liberation 
movement. 163 That definition requires that international legitimization 
of the movement's goals (as opposed to legitimization of the 
movement's actions) be based on the principle of self-determination, 
and that the movement strive to gain control over territory. 164 Under the 
Hamas Covenant, the organization aims to return the Palestinian 
occupied territories to Palestinian control. 165 Other militant factions, 
such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Islamic Jihad also purport the 
goal of Palestinian independence (again, a legitimate goal of an 
organization, but it does not legitimatize the organization's methods). 166 
Therefore, perpetrators who are part of organized Palestinian militant 
organizations, such as Hamas, and commit serious violations of 
customary international law have committed war crimes as defined by 
the Rome Statute. 
Hamas is an organized Palestinian militant organization. 
Additionally, Hamas claimed responsibility after the attack on June 18, 
2002. 167 The attack was part of a military strategy which aims to force 
an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in return for 
the suspension of further attacks. 168 Thus, serious violations of 
customary international law committed by Hamas are war crimes. 
The remainder of this subsection will determine whether the attack 
of June 18, 2002 was a serious violation of international humanitarian 
161. Commentaries to Draft Articles, supra note 158, at 112. 
162. See CASSESE, supra note 94, at 76; see Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 47. 
163. See CASSESE, supra note 94, at 76. 
164. Id. 
165. The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Aug. 18, 1988, art. 9-11, at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
166. See BBC NEWS, Profile: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1760492.stm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also 
BBC NEWS, Who are Islamic Jihad?, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 
1658443.stm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). 
167. W.S.J., supra note 7. 
168. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 16. 
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law, and if so, whether the attack should be considered a war crime. 
i. Willful Killing 
The war crime of willful killing requires that the perpetrators, the 
Hamas members who planned the attack and supplied Mohammed al-
Ral with explosives, intended on killing one or more protected persons 
who belonged to an adverse party to the conflict. 169 Humanitarian law 
broadly defines protected persons as those who "at a given moment and 
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a P~ to the conflict or Occupying Power 
of which they are not nationals."1 0 Israeli civilians fall within the class 
of "enemy nationals" vis-a-vis Palestinian militants, and as such are 
considered protected persons.171 When the Israeli civilian passengers 
boarded Bus 32A shortly before 7:50 on the morning of June 18, they 
found themselves in the hands of the Palestinian militant organization 
Hamas. Therefore, Hamas' planning of an attack which intentionally 
caused the deaths of nineteen Israeli civilians was an instance of the war 
crime of willful killing. 
ii. Attacking Civilians 
The war crime of attacking civilians requires the perpetrators to 
intentionally direct an attack on civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities. 172 In the instance of the bombing of Bus 32A, the intent to 
kill civilians is shown by the choice of tarTet and timing, as well as 
Hamas' claim of responsibility for the attack. 73 
The late Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmad Y assin argued that 
Israelis are not civilians under the international humanitarian law.174 
Sheikh Y assin claimed that: 
The Geneva Convention protects civilians in occupied 
territories not civilians who are in fact occupiers. [All 
Israelis] are criminals. They took my house and my 
169. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, at art. 8(2)(a)(i). 
170. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 4. 
171. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Commentaries, art. 4, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter Convention on Protection of Civilians in War]. The Commentaries state that 
"there are two main classes of protected persons: (1) 'enemy nationals' within the territory 
of the Parties to the conflict and (2) 'the whole population' of occupied territories .. . "Id. 
172. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b )(i). 
173. W.S.J., supra note 7. 
174. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 44. 
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country. The soldier who attacks us, the pilot who bombs 
us, where do they live? All of Israel . . . is occupied 
Palestine. So we're not actually targeting civilians-that 
would go against Islam. 175 
This argument is unconvincing. Under Article 50(1) of the First 
Additional Protocol, a civilian is someone who is not a member of an 
organized armed force or a party to a conflict. 176 The general rule is a 
presumption that "[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian."177 As previously stated, 
civilians are protected by the Convention only for such time as they do 
not take a direct part in hostilities. 178 However, taking part in hostilities 
only causes a temporary loss of protection under humanitarian law .179 
For example, the civilians taking part in the fracas which resulted in 
Nizin's death lost their protected status only for such time as they 
engaged in the hostilities. Therefore civilians "cannot be killed at any 
time other than while they are posing an imminent threat to lives. "180 
Thus, the Israelis on Bus 32A were civilians under humanitarian law 
and the attack upon them was a war crime. 
iii. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage 
The attack of June 18 also satisfies the elements of the war crime 
of excessive incidental death, injury or damage. The crime requires that 
the perpetrator has launched an attack with the knowledge that the 
attack would "cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects ... [to] such an extent as to be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated."181 This crime "reflects the proportionality requirement 
inherent in determining the legality of any military activity undertaken 
175. Flore de Preneuf, No Israeli Targets Off-Limit, Hamas Spiritual Chief Warns, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/081101/ 
news_pf/Worldandnation/No_Israeli_targets_of.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also 
Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 54-55. 
176. Protocol I, supra at note 68, art. 50(1); Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 54. 
177. Protocol I, supra at note 68, art. 50(1). 
178. Id. at art. 51(3). 
179. Id. 
180. Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its 
Policy of Assassinations, AI Index: MDE 15/056/2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ 
print/ENGMDE150562003 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
181. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv). 
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in the context of an armed conflict."Isz The attack on Bus 32A was 
launched with more than the knowledge that the target was a civilian 
object and that incidental civilian death would occur. The perpetrators 
intended to kill a great number of civilians. For Hamas' leaders 
choosing their targets, "[ t ]he main thin~ is to guarantee that a large 
number of the enemy will be affected," s3 the "enemy" in the instant 
case being Israeli civilians. Is4 
Hamas has justified its targeting of civilians by arguing that they 
do not have the resources to fight for the Palestinian cause by any other 
means. Iss Two months after the attack on Bus 32A, Hamas 
spokesperson Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi stated: 
We don't have F-16's, Apache helicopters and 
missiles. . . . They are attacking us with weapons against 
which we can't defend ourselves. And now we have a 
weapon they can't defend themselves against. ... We believe 
this weapon creates a kind of balance, because this weapon is 
like an F-16. I s6 
Acceptin~ this argument would render international humanitarian law 
useless. Is In nearly every war, one side has greater military resources 
than the other. Iss This inequity in milita~ strength does not remove the 
prohibition against attacking civilians. Is Attacking Israeli civilians in 
order to gain a military advantage by forcing a withdrawal from the 
Occupied Territory is an instance of the war crime of excessive 
incidental death, injury or damage. 
2. Was the Attack of June 18 a Crime Against Humanity? 
The crime against humanity applicable to the June 18 attack is 
murder. The Rome Statute provides three elements of the crime against 
humanity of murder. The attack on Bus 32A, which killed twenty 
civilians satisfies the first, that "[t]he perpetrator killed one or more 
182. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv). 
183. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33. 
184. See text supra Part III.A. I .ii. 
185. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 56. 
186. Molly Moore & John Anderson, Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military 
Balance, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at A 01; Erased in a Moment, supra note 33, at 57. 
187. Erased in a Moment, supra note 33 at 57. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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persons."190 The attack of June 18 also fulfills the second element, that 
the attack "was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population."191 As discussed above, Hamas 
systematically targets Israeli civilians in retaliation to Israeli conduct.192 
Additionally, the frequency of these attacks demonstrates that they are 
part of a widespread military strategy.193 Finally, the third element 
requires the perpetrators to have the mens rea of knowingly carrying out 
these attacks in a widespread or systematic nature. 194 As noted by 
Bassiouni, the term "widespread or systematic" both excludes 
spontaneous or uncontrolled grour conflict and requires the element of 
"policy" for non-State actors. 19 The attack of June 18 was not 
spontaneous or an uncontrolled group conflict, but a planned attack 
against civilian as a matter ofpolicy.19 Therefore, the June 18 attack by 
Hamas on Bus 32A was an instance of the crime against humanity of 
murder. 
B. The Attack of July 24 
The targeted killing of Shehadeh on July 23 left fifteen Palestinians 
dead. 197 The attack was part of Israel's policy of retaliating against 
Hamas terrorism by assassinating those militants believed to be 
responsible. 198 This subsection determines whether the July 23 attack 
was a war crime or a crime against humanity. 
1. Was the Attack of July 23 a War Crime? 
As discussed above, the conflict of the al-Aqsa Intifada satisfies 
the two elements shared by all war crimes under the Rome Statute: that 
the conduct took place during international armed conflict and that the 
perpetrator was aware of the existence of an armed conflict, such that 
his or her actions "took place in the context of and was associated with" 
the conflict. 199 The Israeli government considers the al-Aqsa Intifada 
international armed conflict. 200 The remainder of this subsection will 
190. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 7(1)(a). 
191. See text supra Part IIl.A.1.ii. 
192. See id., A.1.ii & iii. 
193. See Middle East Policy Council, supra note 19. 
194. See text supra Parts Ill.A.1. ii & iii. 
195. Bassiouni, supra note 137, at 245 . 
196. See text supra Part II, III.A. I .ii. 
197. See text supra Part II. 
198. Id. 
199. See text supra Part Ill.A. I. 
200. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19; Report, supra note 49, at 38. 
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explore whether the attack of July 23 satisfies the remaining elements of 
the relevant war crimes. 
i. Willful Killing 
The war crime of willful killing requires that the perpetrators, the 
members of the Israeli government who planned the attack on 
Shehadeh, intended to kill one or more protected persons who belonged 
to an adverse party to the conflict.201 International humanitarian law 
broadly defines protected persons as those whom "at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power 
of which they are not nationals. "202 Palestinian civilians fall within the 
class of protected persons. 203 There is no dispute over Israel's intentions 
in commissioning the attack of July 23, 2002. An Israeli governmental 
inquiry into the attack targeting Shehadeh for assassination found the 
"operational assessments" of the professional military attack to be 
"correct and professional. "204 
The government of Israel argues that "[i]nternational law in 
general and the law of armed conflict in particular recognizes that 
individuals who directly take part in hostilities cannot then claim 
immunity from attack or protection as innocent civilians."205 Following 
this position, Shehadeh's previous participation in Hamas terrorism 
renders him a legal target for execution regardless of whether he was 
participating in armed conflict at the time of the attack. However, this 
position is not consistent with international law. As discussed above, 
under Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions, civilians only lose their protection against armed attack 
while they are taking a direct part in hostilities. 206 The interdictions 
against attacking civilians apply at all other times.207 This is not to argue 
that Israel was prohibited from apprehending and putting Shehadeh on 
trial. International humanitarian law merely prohibits Israel from 
committing the war crime of willful killing. Moreover, putting aside the 
201. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(2)(a)(i). 
202. Geneva IV, supra note 65, art. 4. 
203. Convention on Protection of Civilians in War, supra note 172, at art. 4. The 
Commentaries state that "there are two main classes of protected persons: (1) 'enemy 
nationals' ... and (2) 'the whole population' of occupied territories (excluding nationals of 
the Occupying Powers)." Id. 
204. Inquiry, supra note 10. 
205. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19. 
206. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text. 
207. Id. 
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issue of whether Shehadeh was a legitimate target, the attack occurred 
despite the Israeli government's knowledge of Shehadeh' s wife Leila 
Safira's presence at the time and place of the attack.208 There is no 
dispute over whether Safira was a civilian, and, as such, she was 
protected under international humanitarian law. 
ii. Attacking Civilians 
The war crime of attacking civilians requires the perpetrators to 
intentionally direct an attack at civilians, who are not taking direct part 
in hostilities. 209 The intent to kill civilians is evidenced by Israel's 
acknowledgment that it intended to kill Shehadeh and his wife at a time 
when neither was an active part in military operations against Israel.210 
Israel consistently states that it intends to target only those 
responsible for acts of terrorism, and works to prevent any civilian 
deaths as a result of these actions.211 Setting aside the status of 
Shehadeh and his wife in the instant attack, the official Israeli statement 
that "the timing [of the attack] . . . would have been changed" had the 
government known of the presence of civilians seems incredulous after 
observing that Israel used a F-16 warplane to launch an evening missile 
attack upon a three-story apartment building in a crowded 
neighborhood.212 The likeliness of this sort of attack to kill unintended 
civilians becomes apparent after considering that untargeted civilians 
make up at least 30-35% of the persons killed during these attacks.213 
Additionally, 27 Israeli Air Force reserve pilots signed a petition in 
September 2003 refusing "to participate in air force attacks on civilian 
populations."214 The pilots declared that they "refuse to continue 
harming innocent civilians."215 Therefore, the missile strike on a 
Palestinian apartment building which killed fifteen civilians on July 23 
was an instance of the war crime of attacking civilians. 
208. See Dudkevich, supra note 50. 
209. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(i). 
210. See Dudkevich, supra note 50; see text supra Part III.B.1.i. 
211. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 19 (stating that "[Israel] takes care to 
target only those responsible for the violence, and continues to do its utmost to prevent 
collateral civilian injury or loss of life"). 
212. See supra Part II. See also supra note 4 7. 
213. See Dudkevitch supra note 50. 
214. Greg Myre, 27 Israeli Reserve Pilots Say They Refuse to Bomb Civilians, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at Al2. 
215. Id. 
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iii. Excessive Incidental Death, Injury or Damage 
Finally, the attack of June 18 would satisfy the elements of the war 
crime of excessive incidental death, injury or damage. The standard 
requires the perpetrator to launch an attack with the knowledge that the 
attack would cause incidental death or injury to civilians to such an 
extent as to "be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated."216 This standard requires the 
attack to be proportional to the military objective. The illegality of 
Shehadeh as a target at the time of the attack notwithstanding, a fighter-
jet attack upon an apartment building known to be populated by 
civilians, which was aimed at killing a single individual, is 
disproportionate to the objective of stopping a single individual from 
commissioning future terrorist attacks. 
iv. Officials from the First Bush Administration 
David Rivkin and Lee Casey have defended Israel's July 23 attack 
as being proportional to the threat posed by Shehadeh.217 They argued 
that "Israel's attack ... on Salah. Shehadeh, [which resulted in a number 
of civilian casualties], was legally justified because Shehadeh was a 
highly important Hamas commander, responsible for numerous attacks 
on Israeli targets."218 However, the authors seem to be arguing that the 
attack upon Shehadeh was legally justified in order to prevent future 
attacks on Israeli targets, or that the perpetrators of the attack were 
acting in self-defense. Participation in defensive actions against 
aggression is not a valid justification for the commissioning of war 
crimes. 219 In Prosecutor v. Kordic and Prosecutor v. Cerkez, the ICTY 
Trial Chamber rejected the justification of self defense for war crimes 
committed by Bosnian Croats acting against a policy of Muslim 
aggression.220 The Court noted that "the involvement of a person in a 
'defensive operation' does not 'in itself constitute a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility," emphasizing that "military 
operations in self-defence do not provide a justification for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law."221 
216. Elements of Crimes, supra note 105, art. 8(b)(iv). 
217. David B. Rivkin et al., Suicide Attacks are War Crimes, Targeted Killings Aren't, 
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 8, 2002. Lee Casey is not related to the author. 
218. Id. 
219. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 223. 
220. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, at para. 448-51, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/judgement/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). 
221. Id. at para 452. 
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2. Was the Attack of July 23 a Crime Against Humanity? 
The argument may be made that the attack of July 23 was an 
instance of the crime against humanity applicable to acts of murder. The 
Rome Statute requires three elements for the crime against humanity of 
murder. The first, that "[t]he perpetrator killed one or more persons," is 
satisfied. 222 The second element, the attack "was committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population," 
is also satisfied. 223 The term "widespread or systematic" both excludes 
spontaneous or uncontrolled group conflict and requires the element of 
"policy" for non-state actors. 224 As discussed above, the Israeli 
government's use of targeted assassination is neither spontaneous nor 
uncontrolled group conflict, but instead it is a State policy.225 The 
attacks were also directed against civilian populations. In the instant 
case, Shehadeh was not a military target under international 
humanitarian law.226 The military admitted knowledge that Shehadeh's 
wife was present.227 Moreover, the target was a crowded apartment 
building. 22 The third element requires the perpetrators to have the mens 
rea of knowingly carrying out these attacks in a widespread or 
systematic nature. 229 This element is also fulfilled due to Israel's use of 
the tactic of assassination as part of its counter-terrorist activities. 
Israel's government could have chosen to arrest Shehadeh. Instead, the 
government chose to launch a missile attack on an apartment building, 
leaving fifteen civilians dead. 
There is a strong argument that Israel's crime was not severe 
enough to rise to the level of a crime against humanity. Crimes against 
humanity are deprived of the protection of international human rights 
law, and as such are reserved for those offenses which are of such 
extreme gravity that they offend human dignity.230 These crimes carry a 
stigma not attached to war crimes.231 Israel targets militants for 
assassination who are members of groups, which the Israeli government 
believes threaten the lives of Israeli civilians. While its policy of 
222. Elements of Crimes, supra note I05, art. 7(I)(a)(l). 
223. See discussion supra Part III.A. I .ii; Elements of Crimes, supra note I 05, at art. 
7(1)(a)(2). 
224. Bassiouni, supra note 138, at 245. 
225. See supra Part I. 
226. See supra Part III.A. I .ii. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. See discussion supra Parts III.A. I .ii &.iii. 
230. CASSESE, supra note 94, at 65-66. 
231. See text supra Part 11.B. 
30
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/6
2005] Breaking the Chain of Violence in The Middle East 341 
assassinations contravenes international humanitarian law, it is 
debatable whether the policy has risen to the level of savagery where its 
authors should be stigmatized as offending human dignity, despite the 
fact that the crime fulfills the three elements of the crime against 
humanity of murder. In the end, a judge should weigh these facts in 
determining the guilt or innocence of those who carry out policies that 
target civilians. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The suicide bombing attack of June 18, 2002 and the extrajudicial 
killing of July 23, 2002 were both serious violations of international 
law. The Hamas attack targeted civilians, while the Israeli attack 
targeted an individual, despite the awareness that civilian deaths were 
extremely likely to result. Both attacks killed a large number of 
innocent civilians who were not involved in the armed conflict. Both 
left scores of grieving relations vowing to continue the chain of violence 
that has characterized the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Some commentators have vehemently rejected describing the 
Israeli government's policy of targeted killings as war crimes while 
labeling suicide bombings as such. Rivkin and Casey have attacked 
attempts to equate suicide bombings with extrajudicial killings, arguing 
that such efforts serve "to legitimize terror as a form of warfare, [while] 
impairing the ability of law-abiding States to use force to protect 
themselves. "232 They distinguish the two by arguing that only known 
military targets were attacked, and that civilian buildings such as homes 
may become military targets if used for military purposes.233 The 
civilian deaths which often accompany targeted killings are excused as 
being due to the "fog of war" or "faulty intelligence."234 However, as 
discussed above, this distinction does not excuse these violations of 
international humanitarian law.235 Suicide bombings are war crimes and 
crimes against humanity because the perpetrators target civilians. 
Hamas' s arguments that suicide bombings actually strike military 
targets because of the chance of hitting an off-duty soldier do not serve 
as legal justification for these crimes.236 Similarly, even if the targets of 
the extrajudicial killings were legitimate, attacking civilian targets, 
where a high rate of civilian deaths are extremely likely, is not justified 
232. Rivkin et al., supra, note 217. 
233. Id. 
234. Id.; Dudkevitch, supra note 50. 
235. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
236. See discussion supra Part III.A. I .ii. 
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by the chance of killing a suspected terrorist. 
Two recent student notes have also argued that Israel's policy of 
targeted killings is permissible under international law because the 
policy is not assassination as traditionally defined under customary 
international law, and the policy is legitimate under the doctrine of 
anticipatory self defense. 237 The first argument can be disposed of by 
noting that whether or not Israel's policy of targeted killings should be 
defined as one of assassination is irrelevant; Israel is obliged to follow 
international humanitarian law when engaging in armed conflict with 
Palestinian militants. 238 The second argument, that a State may act in 
preemptive self defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
may also be dispatched quickly. 239 Accepting arguendo that there exists 
a right to preemptive self-defense, that right would not be unlimited. 
Even armed conflict undertaken in self-defense must follow the precepts 
of international humanitarian law, including those prohibiting attacks 
where civilian deaths are extremely likely. 240 
Both suicide bombings and extrajudicial killings are serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. Stating this does not 
legitimize terror as a form of warfare, nor impair the ability of law-
abiding States to protect themselves. However, it implies that the 
perpetrators of these actions should be held accountable. Prosecution of 
the members of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities who have 
promoted these policies is unlikely, given the present political situation. 
However, perhaps the open and frank discussion of what these acts truly 
are can lead to an acknowledgment of the unacceptability of these 
tactics, leading to a point in the future where the perpetrators of these 
war crimes and crimes against humanity are no longer left 
unaccountable. 
CONCLUSION 
Nizin Jamjoum's death by a stray bullet was a random occurrence 
directly linked to the chain of violence in Israel and Palestine. She was 
one of the over 3,800 victims of the al-Aqsa Intifada. As her death left a 
237. J. Nicholas Kendall, Recent Development, Israeli Counter Terrorism: "Targeted 
Killings" Under International Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1069 (2002); Benjamin A. Gorelick, 
Current Development, The Israeli Response to Palestinian Breach of the Oslo Agreement, 9 
NEW ENG. J. lNT'L& COMP. L. 651, 665 (2003). 
238. Kendall, supra note 237, at 1070-78; Gorelick, supra note 237, at 669-70; see 
supra Part II. 
239. Kendall, supra note 237, at 1078-88; Gorelick, supra note 237, at 665-66. 
240. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. 
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grieving brother vowing revenge, the attacks of June 18 and July 23 
2002, which led to the sequence of events that caused her death, 
similarly left scores of grieving relatives who will ensure that the 
violence continues. 
Nations worldwide are dealing with the quandary of how to 
prevent terrorism without eroding individual protections granted by law. 
The prohibition against the commissioning of war crimes, even in the 
battle against terror, must serve as a bulwark past which no further 
erosion may occur. International humanitarian law is the international 
community's legal protection against the excesses of war. Its 
observance strengthens the whole of the body of nations. International 
humanitarian law also provides an individual's only legal protection 
when war has destroyed the protections provided by local governments. 
No one should suffer an abject death. Nizin Jamjoum deserved better. 
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